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The Unconstitutional Burden of
Article 15: A Rebuttal
Edward J. Imwinkelried* and Francis A. Gilligan**
A recent Note in this Journal argued that the military's nonju-
dicial punishment procedures infringe essential rights of service mem-
bers.' The argument was largely based on United States v. Jackson,'
a 1968 Supreme Court decision which declared unconstitutional a
federal statutory provision that encouraged waivers of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. In arguing from Jackson, however, the Note
committed analytic errors serious enough to invalidate its conten-
tion that the Article 15 procedure is unconstitutional.
I. Article 15
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) pro-
vides that a commander may use informal, summary procedures to
impose punishments upon members of his command for minor of-
fenses.3 The punishments are relatively light4 and the imposition
of an Article 15 punishment upon a serviceman does not consti-
tute a federal conviction.5 As the Manual for Courts-Martial em-
phasizes, Article 15 punishments are not merely punitive; rather,
"[p]unishments under Article 15 are primarily corrective in nature. '",
Article 15 proceedings are both a disciplinary mechanism and an in-
strument for pretrial diversion. If the serviceman has violated the
Uniform Code but his commander feels that the offense is too minor
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The opinions and conclusions presented herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School or any other
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S1. See Note, The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. For another discussion questioning the constitutionality
of the procedures, see Carnahan, Comment-Article 15 Punishments, 13 A.F. JAG L.
REv. 270, 273-74 (1971).
2. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
3. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
4. 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 131
(rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM]; Army Regulation Number (Army Reg. No.)
27-10, 3-7, 3-8 (Nov. 26, 1968).
5. United States v. Johnson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 42 C.M.R. 66 (1970); United States
v. Green, 20 C.M.R. 606 (AFBR 1955).
6. MCM 129b.
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to justify blemishing the serviceman's record with a federal convic-
tion, the commander can divert the case from the judicial process.7
The controversial feature of Article 15 procedures is the provision
that the serviceman may demand court-martial in lieu of a nonjudicial
punishment proceeding.8 When a serviceman makes such a demand,
he runs the risk that his commander will prefer court-martial charges
against him,9 which might result in more severe punishment by a
special court-martial 0 and in a federal conviction.1' In effect, the
serviceman must waive the procedural safeguards of a judicial, court-
martial trial before the commander may resort to nonjudicial pun-
ishment procedures. The Note suggests that this feature of Article
15 procedures is unconstitutional under Jackson because it unneces-
sarily encourages servicemen to waive their rights to a judicial trial.12
II. The Jackson Analysis
A. United States v. Jackson
In 1966, a federal grand jury indicted Charles Jackson for a vio-
lation of the Federal Kidnapping Act.' 3 The indictment alleged that
Jackson had kidnapped a person for ransom, transported the hos-
tage across state lines, and released the person harmed. The Federal
Kidnapping Act's penalty clause provided that only a jury could
impose the death penalty. In the district court Jackson moved to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally
impaired the exercise of his rights under the Sixth Amendment be-
cause it forced him to risk imposition of the death penalty as the
price for asserting his right under that Amendment to a jury trial.1
4
The trial judge granted the motion and the Government appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.' 5 In an opinion authored by Justice
Stewart the Court held that the Act unconstitutionally discouraged
the exercise of both "the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty
and ...the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial."' 6 Jus-
7. Id.
8. 10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
9. Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-12b (Nov. 26, 1968).
10. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 815(b), with 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20 (1970).
11. The court-martial is a federal court and its guilty finding constitutes a federal
conviction. See generally United States v. Montgomery, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 35, 42 C.M.R.
227 (1970).
12. See Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1482.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1948).
14. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968).
15. Id. at 571-72.
16. Id. at 581.
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tice Stewart articulated a general rule that a procedure is unconsti-
tutional if it "unnecessarily and needlessly" encourages the waiver
of a constitutional right.' 7
Applying the rule to the facts of the case before the Court, Justice
Stewart concluded that the Act's penalty clause encouraged a waiver
of the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The price for
asserting those rights was the grave risk that the jury would sentence
the defendant to death:
Under the Federal Kidnapping Act, therefore, the defendant
who abandons the right to contest his guilt before a jury is as-
sured that he cannot be executed; the defendant ingenuous
enough to seek a jury acquittal stands forewarned that, if the
jury finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he
will die.'8
The question remained whether the procedure was unnecessary and
needless. Mr. Justice Stewart conceded that Jackson was not a case
in which "the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill
the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose
to exercise them."'19 If Jackson had been such a case, the Court
could have decided the case easily; the procedure would have been
"patently unconstitutional." 20 However, the Government had cor-
rectly pointed out that the procedure served the purpose of mitigat-
ing the death penalty. 21 The Government contended that the pro-
cedure's inhibitory effect on the defendant's exercise of his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights was merely incidental to the pursuit of a
legitimate policy.2 2 Justice Stewart rejoined that the Government
misconstrued the issue: "The question is not whether the chilling
effect is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether
the effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive."23 He conceded
that the goal of limiting the death penalty was legitimate but added
that "[t]hat goal can be achieved without penalizing those defendants
who plead not guilty and demand jury trial. '24 There were other
methods for implementing the policy of limiting the death penalty
and some of them did not encourage any waiver of Fifth or Sixth
17. Id. at 582-83.
18. Id. at 581.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 581-82.
22. Id. at 582.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 582.
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Amendment rights. 2 r5 There was thus no necessity for adopting a
procedure which involved such a waiver. The Government could
have pursued its legitimate policy objective without encouraging a
waiver of constitutional rights.
B. Jackson and the Article 15 Waiver Procedure
The Note attempted to construct an argument that Article 15 un-
necessarily encourages a waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
First, it attempts to equate the serviceman's election of an Article
15 proceeding to a waiver of those rights. It argues that the election
is equivalent to a guilty plea.20 It contends further that the waiver
of a special court is analogous to a waiver of Sixth Amendment rights
because the special court panel is the "functional equivalent" of the
civilian jury.27 Noting the disparity between the punitive powers of
the Article 15 authority and the special court, it argues that the
serviceman is encouraged to waive the special court.2 8
Next, the Note contends that the waiver procedure is unnecessary.
It asserts that none of the asserted justifications for the procedure-
judicial economy, protecting the accused from the deleterious con-
sequences of a federal conviction, and the Government's interest
in an expeditious proceeding for handling minor offenses-is sub-
stantial enough to justify the waiver.
The Note concludes that Jackson mandates a holding that the Ar-
ticle 15 waiver procedure violates servicemen's Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights. The reasoning leading to the conclusion, however, is
faulty in several respects.
1. Waiver of the Fifth Amendment Right Not to Plead Guilty
The Article 15 waiver procedure is invalid if it unnecessarily en-
courages a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty.
The pivotal issues are whether the serviceman's election of an Article
15 proceeding amounts to a guilty plea and, if it does, whether the
right not to plead guilty is thereby unconstitutionally burdened. It
25. Id. at 582-83. The Court stated that
[i]n some States, for example, the choice between life imprisonment and capital
punishment is left to a jury in every case-regardless of how the defendant's guilt
has been determined. Given the availability of this and other alternatives, it is
clear that the selection of the death penalty provision . . . cannot be justified
by its ostensible purpose.
Id.
26. Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1486.
27. Id. at 1487.
28. Id. at 1482.
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seems clear that the election is not equivalent to a guilty plea. The
Note concedes that, formally at least, the election is "neither an
admission of guilt nor a trigger for automatic punishment .. 2. .9
The Manual for Courts-Martial points out that, even if the service-
man elects an Article 15 proceeding, he may submit matters in
defense.30 Army Regulation 27-10 states that "[t]he right and op-
portunity to present matters in . . . defense . . . will be stressed [in
the Article 15 proceeding]." 31 The new Suggested Guide for Con-
duct of Nonjudicial Punishment Procedures, which commanders
will soon use to conduct Article 15 proceedings, stresses that the
commander should assure the serviceman that,
If you decide to consent to these proceedings, I will not inter-
pret your consent as an admission that you committed the of-
fense(s); you can consent to the proceedings and still submit
evidence in defense.
3 2
The new Army pamphlet for enlisted personnel, Legal Guide for the
Soldier, also points out to the serviceman that, in an Article 15 pro-
ceeding, he may submit defensive evidence even if he waives court-
martial. 33 The serviceman's election thus is clearly not a guilty plea.
The Note asserts that in practice, however, commanders disregard
the rule:
The . .. argument-that accepting an Article 15 does not neces-
sarily lead to conviction and punishment-is simply at war with
reality. It is, of course, theoretically possible for a commander
to decline to impose punishment, but in practice this possibility
is virtually nil.
3 4
This assertion lacks empirical foundation. Of course, the indis-
putable fact is that, in the vast majority of cases in which a com-
mander initiates an Article 15 proceeding, he ultimately imposes pun-
ishment. But it is a non sequitur to conclude on the basis of this
fact that electing Article 15 is equivalent to a guilty plea. The high
conviction rate in federal district courts does not prove that federal
judges and juries are incapable of giving defense evidence serious
29. Id. at 1484-85.
30. MCM, supra note 5, 133a.
31. Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-13a (Sept. 7, 1971).
32. Army Reg. No. 27-10, App. E (to be published in January 1974).
33. Army Pam. No. 27-14, 5-1.2d (Mar. 30, 1973).
34. Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1486.
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consideration. 35 The conclusion is nothing more than ipse dixit and
as such is insufficient to show that the opportunity to demonstrate
innocence afforded in an Article 15 proceeding is sham.
Even if it is conceded arguendo that an Article 15 election is
tantamount to a guilty plea, the procedure would still pass con-
stitutional muster. The Note contends that under Jackson a defendant
may not be required to face the prospect of more serious punishment
if he pleads innocent rather than guilty since his Fifth Amendment
right not to plead guilty will thereby be burdened.30 In 1970, the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected this interpretation of Jackson. In
Brady v. United States,37 the petitioner had changed his plea from
not guilty to guilty, allegedly to avoid the possibility of a death pen-
alty which could have been imposed after a jury trial and guilty
verdict.38 Brady subsequently contended that the prospect of a death
penalty had unconstitutionally coerced his guilty plea.30 Writing for
the majority, Justice White held that a guilty plea was not
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever
motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or
probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher
penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.40
The opinion emphasized that the critical inquiry in evaluating the
constitutionality of a guilty plea was whether it was voluntarily ten-
dered.41 Subsequent decisions have continued to emphasize the volun-
tariness issue -42 and have reaffirmed the conclusion in Brady that a
guilty plea is not invalid under Jackson simply because it is induced
35. See Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over a Civilian
Defendant, 51 MIL. L. REv. 1, 37 n.253 (1971).
36. See Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1484-86. This interpretation of Jackson has been
discussed by several commentators. See, e.g., Poe, Capital Punishment Statutes in the
Wake of United States v. Jackson: Some Unresolved Questions, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
719, 739 (1969); Comment, United States v. Jackson: Guilty Pleas and Replacement
Capital Punishment Provisions, 54 CORNELL L. RaV. 448, 450 (1969); 35 BROOKLYN L. Rv.
122, 128 (1968).
37. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
38. Id. at 743-44, 746, 749-50.
39. Id. at 744, 746.
40. Id. at 751.
41. Id. at 750-55.
42. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1971) ("The [guilty]
plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises,
the essence of those promises must in some way be made known."); North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) ("The standard [for determining the validity of a guilty
plea] was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.").
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by the possibility that more serious punishment might result from
a plea of not guilty.
43
The Yale Note omits any discussion of Brady and later cases. 41
Clearly these cases lead to the conclusion that the Article 15 election
procedure is constitutional, even assuming arguendo that an election
amounts to a guilty plea. By so "pleading guilty," a service member
avoids the possibility that he will receive the more severe punish-
ment which might result if he "pleads not guilty," i.e., refuses to
elect an Article 15 proceeding and insists instead on a special court.
While in individual cases a commander's misconduct or failure to
provide proper advice might render the "plea" nonvoluntary, the
prescribed Article 15 procedures would, if adhered to, enable the
service member to make a voluntary, informed choice, as required
by Brady and subsequent decisions.
45
2. Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial
The Note's Sixth Amendment argument poses four questions: (1)
Does the Jackson rationale apply to the waiver of nonconstitutional
43. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
44. The Note does cite one post-Brady "plea bargain" case, North Carolina v.
Alford. Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1486 n.40. However, the Note cited Alford
only to support the proposition that a waiver of the right to trial constituted the
"essence of a guilty plea." Id. at 1486. The Note failed to discuss the main holding in
Alford-that a guilty plea tendered in order to avoid a death penalty is valid under
Brady even though accompanied by protestations of innocence. See 400 U.S. at 31-39.
"An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." Id. at 37.
45. The procedures accompanying initiation of an Article 15 proceeding seem suffi-
cient to enable the serviceman to make a voluntary "guilty plea" election under the
Brady standards. See note 42 supra. The commander begins an Article 15 proceeding
by notifying the serviceman. MCM, supra note 5, 133a, Army Reg. No. 27-10, 9 3-14a
(Sept. 7, 1971). The notification has several elements. First, the commander informs
the serviceman that he has received a report that the serviceman has violated the
Uniform Code. MCM 133a, Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-14a (Sept. 7, 1971). Second,
the commander informs the serviceman of his rights under Article 31(b) of the Code;
that is, the commander apprises the individual that he has the right to remain silent
and that anything he says can be used against him in a court-martial trial. MCM
133a, Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-14a (Sept. 7, 1971). See 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1970).
Third, the commander tells the serviceman that he may consult legally qualified coun-
sel concerning the proposed disciplinary action. Army Reg. No. 27-10, , 3-12a (Sept.
7, 1971). The commander must inform the serviceman of the location of counsel whomn
he may consult. Id. The counsel must be a judge advocate officer, a Department of the
Army civilian attorney, or an officer admitted to the bar of a federal court or the
highest court of a state. Id. Fourth, the commander informs the serviceman that he
is considering imposing nonjudicial punishment for the offense. MCM 133a, Army
Reg. No. 27-10, 3-12a (Sept. 7, 1971). Upon request, the commander must apprise
the serviceman of the maximum authorized punishment for the offense in an Article
15 proceeding and in a court-martial. Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-12b (Sept. 7, 1971).
Fifth, the commander tells the serviceman that he may demand court-martial in lieu
of the Article 15 proceeding. MCM 132-33a, Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-12a (Sept. 7,
1971). Sixth, the commander informs the serviceman that he may demand an informal
hearing at which the serviceman may call witnesses and be represented by a spokesman.
Dep't of the Army Military Justice Message No. 11,618, Subject: Interim Change to Army
Reg. No. 27-10 (March 16, 1973).
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rights? (2) If not, does the serviceman nevertheless waive a Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial when he waives court-martial? (3)
Assuming that the serviceman waives a constitutional right, what
standard must the Government meet to justify the waiver procedure?
and (4) Can the Government meet the governing standard?
With respect to the first issue the Note argues that Jackson ap-
plies to the waiver of nonconstitutional rights, stating that "even
statutory rights once granted must be implemented in a constitutional
manner."' 4 6 As authority for Jackson's extension to statutory rights,
the Note cites Carter v. Jury Commission.4 T Carter is inapposite. In
that case state officials had discriminated against blacks in the selec-
tion of grand jurors. Several black residents challenged the dis-
crimination as a denial of equal protection. The defendants invoked
the right-privilege distinction; they argued that the black residents'
complaint did not state a constitutional claim because grand jury
service is a privilege. 48 The Supreme Court properly rejected the
argument. In Carter, the claim had patently constitutional dimensions.
The discrimination itself violated the letter of the equal protection
clause.
The intended meaning of the assertion that "even statutory rights
once granted must be implemented in a constitutional manner" is
somewhat difficult to elucidate. If the statement means that statu-
tory rights must be implemented in accordance with independently
applicable constitutional standards, then it is of course unassailable
and Carter is apposite. In this case, however, the statement does not
address the question of whether the Article 15 waiver procedure is
invalid under Jackson if there are no "independent" grounds for
unconstitutionality such as an equal protection violation. If the state-
ment means that, while a serviceman has no Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial, the statutory provision of a procedure comparable to
a jury trial must comport with Sixth Amendment standards, then it
is without support in constitutional law.
The analysis in the Note thus fails to advance the thesis that
Jackson applies to waivers of nonconstitutional rights. The appli-
cable case law is certainly of no assistance. On its face, Justice
Stewart's opinion in Jackson does not extend the doctrine to waivers
of nonconstitutional rights. Whenever Justice Stewart referred to
the waiver in question, he specifically described it as a surrender
46. Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1487.
47. 396 U.S. 220 (1970).
48. Id. at 330.
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of constitutional rights.49 This practice is certainly some evidence
that he intended to limit Jackson to waivers of constitutional rights.
The lower courts which have addressed the question have restricted
Jackson to waivers of constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit has expressly found that Jackson was concerned
with a "burden on the exercise of a constitutional right."' 51 In Wool-
lard v' United States,51 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
refused to apply the Jackson doctrine to a statute which did "not
interfere with any constitutional right ... The Nevada Supreme
Court reached the same conclusion in Goldstein v. Pavlikowski. 3
The Note has thus given Carter an excessively broad reading which
has no support in the case law.
We must now reach the second question: By waiving his right to
special court, does the serviceman waive a Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial? The Note asserted that the court-martial panel is the
"functional equivalent" of a civilian jury.54 This assertion scarcely
supports the proposition that the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial subsumes the statutory right to special court-martial trial. For
two reasons, the question must be answered in the negative.
First, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial does not apply where the serviceman has committed an
offense triable by court-martial. 55 The Warren Court approvingly
cited the rule in 1969513 and the Burger Court recently reiterated it.7
The Article 15 waiver procedure thus presents much the same
issue as confronted lower courts which were asked to evaluate the
validity of jury trial waivers in juvenile court proceedings in the
aftermath of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania."8 Many jurisdictions require
49. See, e.g., 390 U.S. at 582-83.
50. Brady v. United States, 404 F.2d 601, 602 (10th Cir. 1968), alf'd, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249, 253 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
403 U.S. 946 (1971).
51. 416 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 51.
53. 87 Nev. 512, 489 P.2d 1159 (1971).
54. Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1487.
55. See Whelchel v. .IcDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950): "Petitioner can gain no
support from the analogy of trial by jury in the civil courts. The right to trial by
jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to trials by courts-martial
or military commissions."
56. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969) (emphasis in original):
[T]he exigencies of military discipline require the existence of a special system of
military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed es-
sential in Art. III trials need apply. The Fifth Amendment specifically exempts
"cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger" from the requirement of prosecution by indict-
ment and, inferentially, from the right to trial by jury.
57. Gosa v. Mayden, 93 S. Ct. 2926 (1973).
58. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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that youthful offenders waive jury trial as a condition precedent to
trial in juvenile court." Several courts had taken the position that
Jackson invalidated the waiver procedure. 0 However, the trend in
the decisional law changed radically after the Supreme Court's de-
cision in McKeiver, which held that jury trials need not be pro-
vided in juvenile court proceedings.6'
In his majority opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized that:
There is a possibility at least that the jury trial, if required, will
remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process
and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.62
Influenced by McKeiver, the prevailing view is now that Jackson
does not invalidate the jury trial waiver in juvenile court proceed-
ings. In Flippo v. State,63 the Alabama Supreme Court sustained the
waiver provision in its state Youthful Offender Act. In Robinson
v. State,'34 the Georgia Supreme Court did likewise. The court em-
phasized that
[t]hat case [Jackson] is not analogous to the juvenile's choice be-
tween having the charges against him heard in a juvenile court
without a jury, or being tried as an adult in the criminal court,
with the consequent right of trial by jury.65
In In re Fucini,6 6 the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the majority
view. The Illinois court stressed "the inherent differences between
juvenile and criminal proceedings. ' 6 7 The Courts of Appeal for the
59. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2420 (1970); Robinson v. State, 227 Ga. 140, 179
S.E.2d 248 (1971).
60. The leading line of cases arose in New York. See, e.g., People v. Michael A.C.,
27 N.Y.2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 620, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1970); Saunders v. Lupiano, 30 App.
Div. 2d 803, 292 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1968); People ex rel. Browne v. Kendall, 62 Misc. 2d
196, 308 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Greene Co. Ct. 1970); People v. Day, 61 Misc. 2d 786, 306
N.Y.S.2d 610 (Herkimer Co. Ct. 1969). Contra, People v. Larry K., 58 Misc. 2d 526,
296 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1968). The progenitor of these decisions was United States
v. Nieves, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
61. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Blackmun stressed
that, "[OJf all the possible due process rights which could be applied in juvenile
courts, the right to trial by jury is the one which would be most likely to be dis-
ruptive of the unique nature of the juvenile process." Id. at 540. See also Braxton v.
Carlson, 483 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir. 1973): "[T]he transformation of this informal
[prison disciplinary] hearing into a formal adversary proceeding with the full panoply
of counsel, cross-examination, witnesses, and written record could be self-defeating."
62. 403 U.S. at 545.
63. 269 So. 2d 155 (Ala. 1972).
64. 227 Ga. 140, 179 S.E.2d 248 (1971).
65. Id. at 142, 179 S.E.2d at 250.
66. 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
67. Id. at 311, 255 N.E2d at 383.
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Sixth,68 Eighth,60 and Ninth Circuits 0 have all adopted the view
that the jury trial waiver in juvenile court proceedings is constitu-
tional.
The Article 15 waiver procedure and the jury trial waiver in ju-
venile court proceedings serve similar governmental policies. The
two principal advantages of a juvenile court proceeding are that the
juvenile court's focus is corrective and that the proceeding shields
the youth from an adult conviction. 71 The Article 15 procedure has
equivalent advantages. More to the point, both waiver procedures
are constitutional since neither involves the surrender of a Sixth
Amendment right.
Second, even if the federal courts would reverse long-established
precedent and hold that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right ap-
plies where the service member has committed an offense triable by
court-martial,72 the Article 15 election feature would meet prevail-
ing constitutional standards. In Duncan v. Louisiana,3 the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause in-
corporates the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. However, the
Court carefully pointed out that it was not holding that the right
applied to all types of trials. The Court upheld the common law
rule that the right does not apply to petty offense trials.74 Although
the Court did not draw a precise line between petty and serious of-
fenses,75 Justice White's opinion indicates that an offense punishable
by no more than six months' confinement may be considered petty.70
The maximum punishment which a special court can impose is six
months' confinement at hard labor.77 Hence, even if there were a
right to jury trial in connection with court-martial offenses, the right
would not reach the special court-martial, which is a "petty offense"
tribunal.
Once more, the jury trial issue can be resolved in favor of the
68. United States v. King, 482 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
69. Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971).
70. United States v. Salcido-Medina, 483 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. James, 464 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1973).
71. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
72. The trend of current decisions does not appear to be in this direction. In Daigle
v. Warner, 42 U.S.L.W. 2269 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1973), the Ninth Circuit refused to ex-
tend the Sixth Amendment requirement of appointed counsel for indigents to the sum-
mary couri-martial context. The holding was based on a determination that the Amend-
ment does not cover court-martial proceedings. This decision reversed a district court
holding relied on in the Note. See Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1491.
73. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
74. Id. at 160.
75. Id. at 159-62.
76. Id. at 159.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
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constitutionality of Article 15. But even if it is assumed, in the teeth
of Duncan, that a hypothetical jury trial right would apply to special
courts, the waiver procedure would be constitutional.
If the Article 15 waiver procedure involved the surrender of a
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, the question would remain
what test determines whether the waiver procedure satisfies Jackson.
The Jackson Court did not hold that any procedure encouraging the
waiver of a constitutional right is itself unconstitutional. On the
contrary, it stated that "Congress' objectives . . .cannot be pursued
by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional
rights."78s This statement implies that, at least under some circum-
stances, a provision allowing waiver of the jury trial right would
be constitutional. 79 The lower courts have differed in determining
the standard which the Government must meet to satisfy Jackson.
Some courts hold that if Jackson applies the Government need show
only a rational relationship between the waiver procedure and a
legitimate policy;80 others hold that the Government must prove
a necessary relationship to a legitimate policy.8' In a dissenting opin-
ion, Justice Brennan suggested that the Government must demon-
strate a necessary relationship to a compelling interest.,2
To date, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to resolve this
three-way split of authority. However, the second view-that the
waiver procedure must bear a necessary relationship to a legitimate
government interest-seems most consistent with Justice Stewart's
majority opinion in Jackson. He recognized there that the Kid-
napping Act's penalty clause was rationally related to the legitimate
policy of mitigating the death penalty, but demanded a showing of
a necessary relationship between the policy and the waiver pro-
78. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[T]he ma-
jority [in Jackson] did not rely upon the summary argument that the exercise of such
a [constitutional] right could in no way be made costly. The Court rather asked
'whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.'"); Martin v. Superior
Court, 17 Cal. App. 3d 412, 417, 95 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112-13 (1971) (emphasis in original):
We note that . . . Jackson [does not] hold that a statute which might in any
conceivable or questionable way touch upon the exercise of a constitutional right is
for that reason invalid. Indeed, as indicated, the Court in Jackson was careful to
point out that it was holding void only such statutes . . . "that needlessly chill the
exercise of basic constitutional rights ...."
80. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 343, 250 A.2d 811, 814 (1969)
(The challenged procedure must "advance a legitimate 'purpose or effect.' ").
81. See, e.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 3d 412, 417, 95 Cal. Rptr.
110, 113 (1971) (The procedure must be "reasonably required for reasons of policy
or convenience.').
82. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970) (Brennan, White & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting).
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cedure8s There is not a single sentence in the opinion which sug-
gests that the procedure must be necessarily related to a compelling
state interest. The Supreme Court is well aware of the distinction
between compelling and merely legitimate government policies.
8 4
If Justice Stewart had intended the constitutional standard to be
the former, he undoubtedly would have so specified.
Assuming, then, that the controlling test for waivers of constitu-
tional rights is a necessary relationship to a legitimate state interest,
the Article 15 procedure would seem to be constitutional. This con-
clusion gains at least tangential support from two categories of cases
sustaining the constitutionality of procedures roughly analogous to
the Article 15 waiver. Furthermore, it seems consistent with an anal-
ysis of the governmental interests served by Article 15.
The first category of cases involves civil service disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In Coleman v. Ginsberg,8 a civil service employee's su-
perior recommended that he be disciplined by a fine. Under New
York law the employee could either accept the fine or demand a
full hearing at which he could receive more serious disciplinary
punishments, including dismissal, suspension, or demotion. The em-
ployee argued that Jackson invalidated the waiver procedure. The
court rejected the argument:
[T]he matter of disciplining employees cannot possibly be analo-
gized to a kidnapping charge carrying a possible death penalty,
nor a statutory provision for a hearing before a hearing officer
to the constitutional right to a jury trial.
8 6
The second category of cases involves instances in which a trial
de novo is available after a summary bench trial. In several states
the prosecutor initially tries criminal cases in a court of limited
jurisdiction by summary bench procedure. If convicted, the defendant
can appeal to the court of general jurisdiction, where he is entitled
to trial de novo but where he may receive a more severe sentence.
8 7
Lower courts had divided on the constitutionality of this procedure.,
However, in Colten v. Kentucky,8 9 the Supreme Court sustained
83. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-83 (1968).
84. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
85. 66 Misc. 2d 46, 319 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
86. .d. at 49, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
87. See, e.g., State v. Keegan, 296 A.2d 483 (Maine 1972); ME. Disr. CRT. R. 37(a),
38, 39(b), 40.
88. See cases cited in Mann v. Commonwealth, 271 N.E.2d 331, 335 nn.5-6 (Mass.
1971).
89. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
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the procedure, noting that "the inferior courts are not designed or
equipped to conduct error-free trials, or to insure full recognition
of constitutional freedoms. They are courts of convenience . . .90
Significantly, the Court stressed the weight of the state's interest in
"conveni[ent], . . . speedy, and inexpensive means of disposition
of charges of minor offenses .... "91 The Kentucky trial de novo
procedure placed the defendant in a difficult position. Under the
Kentucky procedure his only options were to accept the inferior
court's sentence or to appeal, receive a trial de novo, and thereby
run the risk that the court of general jurisdiction would impose a
more severe sentence. The analogy to the Article 15 context is im-
mediately apparent. If the Kentucky procedure is not constitutionally
infirm, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court would in-
validate the Article 15 waiver procedure.
An analysis of the governmental interests furthered by Article 15
provides further support for this conclusion. The governing Army
regulation states that the three purposes of Article 15 are to:
(1) Correct, educate, and reform offenders who have shown
that they cannot benefit by less stringent measures;
(2) Preserve, in appropriate cases, an offender's record of serv-
ice from unnecessary stigmatization by record of court-
martial conviction; and
(3) Further military efficiency by disposing of minor offenses
in a manner requiring less time and personnel than trial
by court-martial. 92
a. Military Discipline
The first objective-which may be characterized as the military
discipline interest-is far different from the governmental interest
which was at stake in Jackson. In Jackson, aside from minor con-
siderations of economy and convenience, it was a matter of complete
indifference to the Government whether Jackson was tried by judge
or jury. The judge has no special or unique responsibility for the
maintenance of law and order in the civilian community; that com-
munity can maintain its peace and order as long as someone, judge
or jury, acts on the offenses. Unlike the civilian judge, the military
commander is responsible for the discipline of the persons subject
to his punitive jurisdiction. The state of his unit's discipline deter-
90. Id. at 117.
91. Id.
92. Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-4a (Sept. 7, 1971).
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mines the unit's overall ability to achieve its mission. In a combat
situation the state of the unit's discipline might determine whether
the unit's members live or die. The commander's Article 15 powers,
his only personal, punitive powers,93 greatly enhance his ability to
maintain discipline within his unit. There are undoubtedly those
who would scoff that such an intangible governmental interest can-
not be substantial. However, it must be remembered that in the
final analysis a soldier's discipline consists of psychological condi-
tioning to immediately obey any order which is not patently illegal.
94
The commander is responsible for that conditioning and it is he who
will ultimately issue the order which might mean survival for the
unit. If the governmental interest in strong military leadership is
"legitimate,"9 5 then the Article 15 procedure is "necessary," since
personal punitive power is essential to effective command.
b. Harm to the Service Member
Two other governmental interests are served by the Article 15
procedure-minimization of harm to the serviceman and maintenance
of judicial efficiency. As in the case of the military discipline in-
terest, the Article 15 procedure seems "necessary" if these goals are
to be adequately served. This point is best made by considering a
set of "less drastic" alternatives which the Note proposed as solu-
tions to the "unconstitutional" burden of Article 15. The three pro-
posals were to: (1) abolish Article 15 proceedings, (2) afford the
serviceman the full panoply of judicial safeguards in Article 15 pro-
ceedings, or (3) maintain the waiver procedure but limit the sen-
tence of any subsequent court-martial to the punishments which
the commander could have initially imposed in an Article' 15 pro-
ceeding.0 6
93. His other powers are either administrative, nonpunitive powers, e.g., to sus-
pend privileges or to recommend that other agencies take punitive action.
94. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (ACMR 1973); BRITISH MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW 433 (1958); L. OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, II INTERNATION LAW § 253 (8th
ed. 1955); W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 296 (2d ed. 1896).
95. The Note does not question the legitimacy of this state interest. See Yale Note,
supra note 1, at 1489. See generally 119 CONG. REC. S. 3137-38 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1973)
(remarks of Senator Bayh on S. 987); Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 363 (1970);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
The Note authors suggest that non-Article 15 administrative action might adequately
serve the military discipline interest. See Yale Note 1492 ("a commander would still
have authority [in the absence of Article 15] to remove discretionary privileges, recom-
mend against promotion or other favorable personnel action, and issue reprimands . ..").
These alternative means, however, would be far from adequate. See Hearings on H.R.
7656 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4903 (1962).
96. Yale Note 1491.
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In the long run all three alternatives would work to the detri-
ment of servicemen. From the serviceman's point of view the first
alternative is unacceptable. The abolition of Article 15 would vir-
tually ensure a dramatic rise in the number of minor offenses tried
by courts-martial. A much higher percentage of minor offenders
would thus receive federal convictions97 and possibly punitive dis-
charges. 98
The typical serviceman would find the ultimate consequences of
the second alternative almost as unappealing. The predominant sen-
timent among commanders is that Article 15 procedures have already
become overly complex and time-consuming. 99 One of the primary
reasons commanders employ Article 15 is that they can use such
proceedings conveniently; the procedures are informal and swift. Al-
though they are burdened with administrative responsibilities, com-
manders can find the time to conduct summary hearings. It is highly
doubtful, however, that they could find the time to conduct full-
blown trial hearings. If Article 15 proceedings are judicialized, com-
manders will probably prefer court-martial charges in a higher per-
centage of cases.
While the third alternative is the most acceptable, it too has
deficiencies. Limiting the sentencing power of the subsequent court-
martial to the level initially chosen by the commander would tend
to encourage the commander to oblige any serviceman who demands
court-martial. At the present time the commander has a practical
incentive for deciding against preferring court-martial charges for a
trivial offense. If he imposes Article 15 punishment the serviceman
will remain in the unit; the commander will not lose his services.
97. See note 5 supra.
98. For a description of punitive discharges, see THE MILITARY JuDGEs' GUIDE, Army
Pam. No. 27-9, 8-4 (May 19, 1969).
99. TIE COMMIITEE FOR EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT TO GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND (1971). The
Committee found that:
A significant number of junior officers . . . expressed dissatisfaction in varying
degrees in . . . nonjudicial punishment. . . . [M]any commanders feel that the
provisions of Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be changed
to provide for less paperwork-and thus hopefully more prompt punishment-and
for an increase in the punishment powers of commanders. Unquestionably, in re-
cent years-and especially since Article 15 was amended in 1963-the imposition of
nonjudicial punishment has become increasingly complex, thereby placing a greater
burden on an already administratively overburdened commander. . . . [A] con-
tinuing effort must . . . be maintained to insure that the paperwork does not
become so voluminous and complex that it defeats the purpose of nonjudicial
punishment, which essentially is to provide the commander with a simple, ex-
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If the serviceman is court-martialed, on the other hand, he may be
confined or discharged. For this reason a commander with a sense
of proportion is reluctant to prefer court-martial charges against a
soldier who has committed a technical violation of the Code and
rashly demands court-martial. The third alternative would largely
remove this reluctance. If the commander knew that the subsequent
court's sentencing powers would be limited to the level of Article
15 punishments, he could prefer court-martial charges with no fear
of losing the serviceman's services.
This third alternative has a more insidious danger as well. The
limitations on the court's punitive powers would apply only when
the commander had initially offered Article 15 proceedings and the
serviceman had refused the offer. This feature would allow the
commander to evade the limitation nearly at will. In many, if not
most, instances the commander, familiar with the serviceman in
question and the practice within the command, will be able to make
an informed assessment of the likelihood that the serviceman will
decline the Article 15. Thus, the practical effect of the adoption of
the third alternative would be that, when the commander has a
serious doubt whether the serviceman will accept an Article 15 and
wishes to leave the punitive capacity of a subsequent special court-
martial undiminished, he will bypass the Article 15 proceedings and
immediately prefer court-martial charges.
The Note evidences awareness of the seriousness of a court-martial
conviction. It suggests in connection with the third proposal that
any adjudication by a special court-martial demanded by an accused
in an Article 15 proceeding be "decriminalized" and eventually ex-
punged from the serviceman's record.'00 It seems unlikely, however,
that Congress would be willing to change so radically the character
of a court-martial conviction. Certainly no judicial remedy suggests
itself as a vehicle for such a "reform." In any case the procedure
would not be available where the commander is able to "second
guess" the response of the serviceman to the proposed Article 15
proceeding.
In summary, the attack on Article 15 seems dangerously wrong-
minded. For the stated purpose of benefiting the serviceman the
Article 15 waiver procedure is invalidated, but all of the suggested
alternatives to the present procedure would result in an increased
number of federal convictions for minor offenders.
100. See Yale Note, supra note 1, at 1493.
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c. Efficiency of the Military Justice System
The proposals for "reforming" Article 15 proceedings would, by
encouraging commanders to prefer court-martial charges in a higher
percentage of cases, increase the burden on the military justice sys-
tem. Such a result seems undesirable. Article 15 is, in effect, an
efficient mechanism for pretrial diversion. One has only to con-
sider the state of the civilian criminal system to realize how detri-
mental the absence of such a mechanism can be.10 1 Clearly, the pri-
mary reason for the civilian courts' dismal performance in providing
speedy trials is that the civilian courts have not developed an ef-
fective instrument for diversion. The civilian courts are clogged with
cases that do not belong in the courtroom.
10 2
In sharp contrast, the military has made speedy trial a meaningful
guarantee for the serviceman. The Court of Military Appeals has
recently announced that it will dismiss charges against an accused
who has been in pretrial confinement for more than 90 days unless
the Government makes an exacting showing of diligence. 0 3 Some
military jurisdictions have shortened the time period to 45 days.1
0 4
Needless to say, it will be years before it will be practical for the
Supreme Court to impose so salutary a rule on the civilian criminal
courts.101
101. The civilian criminal process is in dire need of an effective plan for pretrial
diversion. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF Jus-ricE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 5 (1967). The Commission called for a
frank recognition that "[i]t is not in the interest of the community to treat all of-
fenders as hardened criminals." The Commission believed that a large percentage of
persons presently prosecuted should be referred "to noncriminal agencies for treatment
or for some degree of supervision without criminal conviction." Id.
102. See Kadish, The Crisis of Overcrirninalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 159-62 (1967);
Nixon, Reforming the Administration of Justice, 57 A.B.A.J. 421 (1971). In a recent
report, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal justice Standards and Goals
recommended that traffic violations be disposed of by informal administrative pro-
ceedings rather than judicial trials. See Task Force on Courts of the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Recommendations, 14 CRIm. L.
REP. 3014 (1973).
103. United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1972). In a more
recent decision, United States v. Marshall, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 435, 47 C.M.R. 409, 413
(1973), the Court of Military Appeals reinforced Burton. The court stated that, where
Burton applies, the Government must show "extraordinary reasons" to rebut the pre-
sumption. Elaborating, the court asserted that
the Government must demonstrate that really extraordinary circumstances beyond
such normal problems as mistakes in drafting, manpower shortages, illnesses, and
leave [vacation] contributed to the delay.
104. The United States Army, Europe, adopted the 45-day rule in USAREUR Sup-
plement 2, Sept. 27, 1971, to Army Reg. No. 27-10.
105. The Second Circuit had promulgated a comparable rule in which the time limit
was six months. Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases,
Rule 4. 28 U.S.C.A. App. (Supp. 1973). Even so moderate a rule proved difficult in its
application. See cases cited in United States v. Scafo, 480 F.2d 1312, 1313 n.1 (2d Cir.
1973). The set of rules was recently replaced by a "Plan for Achieving Prompt Dis-
position of Criminal Cases" (App. Feb. 28, 1973; eff. April 1, 1973).
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One of the principal reasons that the military is able to process
offenses so speedily is the common use of Article 15 to divert minor
offenses from the judicial process. The effect of reducing the di-
versionary capacity of Article 15 would be to make the "speedy trial"
guarantee as meaningless for the military defendant as it is for his
civilian counterpart. The armed forces' use of Article 15 should
offend only those who place undue faith in the judicial process. A
society with clogged courtrooms and crowded trial dockets should
have learned long ago that the judicial process is not a panacea for
America's ills.
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